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This action involves the imposition of sales tax 
on the following: 
1. New cars of appellant's used personally by 
Mrs. Merrill Bean; and 
2. Demonstrators unassigned to salesmen^and oc-
casionally used as loaners to customers hav-
ing their cars repaired and to other sales-
men. 
Appellant sets forth in his Brief (AB-l)that: 
"... at all times and under all circum-
stances the automobiles are at the dealer-
ship for sale to an ultimate consumer unless 
they are then being demonstrated." 
In response to a question of whether demonstrators are used 
for family purposes, Merrill Bean, the owner and president 
of appellant, answered affirmatively. (T-42) The automobile 
utilized by Mrs. Merrill Bean is used in connection with 
family use, such as, transporting children to and from school 
and church, to drive to community meetings, school board meet-
ings, community projects in which she is involved, and trans-
porting other ladies with her. (T-81,82) Mrs. Merrill Bean 
is not an officer or employee of appellant's and is not li-
censed with appellant's dealership to transact business. 
(T-89) Mrs. Merrill Bean fs automobile is not at the dealer-
ship at all times and under all circumstances as indicated in 
Appellant's Brief. 
Merrill Bean Chevrolet has title by a flooring agree-
ment with General Motors Acceptance Corporation to all auto-
mobiles, and regular salesmen sign a Demonstrators' Agreement 
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when a demo is personally assigned to them and are charged 
a fee and a sales tax on regular demonstrators directly as-
signed to them. (T-52) Mrs. Merrill Bean did not execute 
a Demonstrators" Agreement. (T-55) Merrill Bean has signed 
a Demonstrators 1 Agreement on behalf of his wife in order . 
to get insurance protection but did not pay the demonstrators 1 
fee or the sales tax. The Internal Revenue Service requires 
Merrill Bean to treat the use of Mrs. Bean's automobile as 
compensation to Merrill Bean. (T-91) 
Many new cars are designated demonstrators for 
accounting and other purposes but are unassigned to any 
specific salesman. Unassigned demonstrators are loaned to 
salesmen for a few days, pending receipt of a new car demon-
strator for said salesman. No agreement is signed by the 
salesman, and no sales tax is collected. (T-65) Unassigned 
demos are also loaned to customers for a few days who are 
having their regular cars serviced and repaired. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE TAX COMMISSION'S SALES TAX 
REGULATIONS ARE VALID AND PROVIDE FOR ASSESS-
MENT OF SALES TAX ON DEMONSTRATORS PERSONALLY 
USED AND CONSUMED BY MRS. MERRILL BEAN. 
All references to "sales tax11 herein are intended 
to and do include "sales and use" taxes, since both taxes 
are correlative and complementary. (Union Portland Cement 
v. State Tax Commission, 110 U.152, 176 P.2d 879) 
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provides 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-20 (1953), 
"Administration vested in tax commissi on.--
The administration of this act is vested in 
and shall be exercised by the state tax commis-
sion which may prescribe forms and rules and 
regulations in conformity with this act for the 
making of returns and for the ascertainment, as-
sessment and collection of the taxes imposed 
hereunder." (See also UCA, Section 59-16-2) 
Pursuant to said statutory grant of authority to 
prescribe rules and regulations, the State Tax Commission 
has adopted Sales Tax Regulation S-82, effective July 1, 
1971, which provides, in part: 
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Regarding the adoption of rules and regulations by 
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administrative body of the State of Utah, this Court, in 
Utah Hotel Company v. Industrial Commission, 107 Utah 24, 
151 P.2d 467 (1944), stated, in dictum: 
"We deem it essential to a clear under-
standing of the problems implicit in this 
matter to note at the outset that regulations 
of administrative tribunals are not all birds 
of a feather. Failure to note this fact will 
inevitably lead to hazy thinking and erroneous 
concepts. The weight which should be given to 
a prior administrative regulation will to a 
large extent be dependent upon the type of 
regulation involved. Regulations may be promul-
gated pursuant to a specific delegation of 
legislative power. In prescribing such regulations, 
the administrative tribunal within designated 
limits may actually be making the law or pres-
cribing what the law shall be. In prescribing 
such a regulation, the tribunal in effect legis-
lates within the boundaries marked out for its 
action by legislative enactment. On the other 
hand, the administrative tribunal may by adopting 
a given regulation only purport to interpret what 
the legislature meant by its statutory language. 
Such a regulation is nothing but an administrative 
opinion as to what the statute under construction 
means." (At page 31) 
Sales Tax Regulation S-82 is lawfully adopted. It was intended 
to apply directly to situations like the case at hand on the 
use and consumption of vehicles by the wife of the owner of 
a car dealership. 
Utah Concrete Products Corporation v. State Tax 
Commission, 101 Utah 513, 517, 125 P.2d 408 (1942), provides 
the applicable definition of "consumption" as: 
"From the context of our statute 'used1 
and 'consumed1 may be said to express the 
same meaning — to make use of, to employ and 
does not necessarily mean the immediate destruc-
tion or extermination or change in form, of the 
article or commodity." 
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The imposition of the sales tax in the Merrill 
Bean Chevrolet situation upon the automobile utilized by 
Mrs. Bean results from a taxable incidence taking place. 
That is, there has been a final consumption of the tangible 
personal property. Mrs. Merrill Bean utilizes said ve-
hicle for personal errand running, to attend church and 
transport herself and the family to civic and other func-
tions and personal duties. Said automobiles are consumed 
within the meaning of the sales tax statute. 
Also at issue in connection with the application 
of Sales Tax Regulation S-82 is whether a retail sale takes 
place sufficient to give rise to an incidence of sales tax 
liability. Utah Code Annotated, Section 59-15-2 ( b ) , de-
fines "sale" to include every transaction whereby the pos-
session of property is transferred but the seller retains 
the title as security for payment of the price. 
Sales Tax Regulation S-27 provides the definition 
of a "retail sale" to include every sale within the State of 
Utah by a retailer or wholesaler to a user or consumer, ex-
cept such sales as are exempted. 
"A retail sale has a broader meaning 
than the sale of tangible personal property. 
And includes any transfer, exchange or barter 
whether conditional or for a consideration by 
a person doing business in such commodity or 
service, either as a regularly organized princi-
pal endeavor or as an adjunct thereto. The 
price of the service or tangible personal prop-
erty, the quantity sold or the extent of the 
clientele are not factors which determine a 
sale to be or not to be a retail sale." 
_£_ 
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However, S-27 provides that a particular retail sale or 
a portion of the selling price may not be subject to the 
sales or use tax. Sales Tax Regulation S-72 provides 
guidelines for trade-in's and exchanges. An even exchange 
of tangible personal property for tangible personal property 
is not a sale and no tax applies to any part of such an ex-
change. When a retailer takes tangible personal property 
as part payment on a sale of tangible personal property, 
sales or use tax applies to any consideration valued in 
money which changes hands but does not apply to the portion 
of the sale represented by the trade-in allowance. S-72 
necessarily requires that there be an arms-length transac-
tion, and that the parties be acting in good faith with one 
another. In the present situation, Mrs. Merrill bean is deal-
ing with a corporation wholly-owned by her husband and is not 
engaged in an arms-length transaction. Mrs. Bean appears to 
be subject to the control and management of her husband in 
retaining any given car for a period of time. The use tax 
is primarily imposed upon the transaction between General 
Motors and Merrill Bean Chevrolet, since Mrs. Bean uses the 
car. Merrill Bean Chevrolet does not exchange or trade cars 
back to General Motors. (T-62) 
Appellant has stated in his Brief (AB-6-7) that 
Mrs. Bean drives as many as five different vehicles in a 
given year, and that these vehicles are traded back to the 
dealership without any cash consideration. Appellant sets 
forth in its Brief that the record is entirely void of any 
suggestion that the dealership receives a cash consideration 
when the trade is made. (AB-7) It is hereby submitted that Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the burden is upon the taxpayer to demonstrate that an even 
exchange has been made without any cash consideration which 
taxpayer has failed to demonstrate. Merrill Bean testified 
that occasionally Mrs. Bean's car is sold to a customer, but 
it is unclear whether the sale takes place before or after 
Mrs. Bean exchanges her car for a new one. (T-89) Exemptions 
from the sales tax statutes are to be strictly construed 
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authority. 
(68 Am.Jur. 2d, Sales and Use Tax, Section 177) 
Appellant argues in its Brief that certain inherent 
benefits accrue to any retailer within the State of Utah from 
which the wife and family of said retailer may derive bene-
fits free of any incidence of taxation. (AB-12-13) Appel-
lant states that the medical doctor seldom sends a bill to 
his colleague for medical services, or the lawyer seldom bills 
his partners for services rendered to the ultimate consumer, 
or that a tax auditor would not be subject to sales tax for 
an income tax return prepared for his wife and family. (AB-12, 
13) All such benefits bestowed upon the wife and family of 
the professional are distinguishable from the present situa-
tion, in that intangible services have been rendered rather 
than an actual delivery of tangible personal property. The 
services of a doctor, lawyer, or an accountant are not in 
the same category as the delivery of an automobile to the wife 
of the owner of a car dealership. If the wife of an owner 
of a grocery store were to take out her groceries each week, 
said groceries would be subject to sales tax. As a practical 
matter in most situations where the wife and family of a 
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business owner do, in fact, take and consume some of 
the inventory of the company, said items are shown as 
sales, and a sales tax is paid. In addition to the in-
herent benefits' argument set forth by appellant, cer-
tain benefits bestowed upon wives, friends and family 
are taxable as compensation, although as a practical mat-
ter, said taxes are not always assessed and collected. 
(See the 16th Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Internal Revenue Code, Section 62, and Utah Code Anno-
tated, Section 59-14-1, et seq. , which impose an income 
tax upon "income from whatever source derived.") 
There is no double taxation (AB-13), since the 
tax on the initial delivery to Mrs. Bean should be paid 
by Merrill Bean, but any tax paid on a subsequent sale of 
the used automobile is merely collected by Merrill Bean 
Chevrolet and is actually paid by the customer who has pur-
chased the automobile. 
Based upon Sales Tax Regulation S-82 and in the 
absence of any applicable exemption, appellant is liable 
for the sales tax on the vehicles consumed by Mrs. Merrill 
Bean, even though occasionally demonstrated. . 
POINT II 
UNASSIGNED DEMONSTRATORS WHEN UTILIZED FOR 
PURPOSES OTHER THAN SOLELY DEMONSTRATION, 
DISPLAY, OR TRIAL ARE SUBJECT TO SALES AND 
USE TAXES. 
Appellant has properly cited Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 59-16-2 ( b ) , which defines the word "use" to mean Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the exercise of any right or power over tangible personal 
property incident to the ownership of that property, except 
that it does not include the sale, display, demonstration 
or trial of that property in the regular course of business 
and held for resale. 
However, appellant has not pinpointed the tech-
nical difficulty which forms the basis for the assessment 
by the State Tax Commission of additional sales and use taxes. 
That is, whenever any unassigned demonstrators are person-
ally utilized, or utilized for purposes other than solely 
for demonstration, display, or trial and held for resale, 
then said demonstrators are subject to the sales and use 
tax. 
Other states in the United States have attempted 
to deal with the same problem by adopting varying regula-
tions pursuant to the same general provisions in the Uniform 
Sales and Use Tax Acts. 
The State of Massachusetts in Sales Tax Informa-
tion Letter, No. 3, dated March 1966, provides that: 
"1. Vehicles used for demonstration 
to prospective customers only and for no 
other purpose are not taxable to the dealer. 
"2. Vehicles sold to salesmen or other 
employees are taxable in the same manner as 
sales to other individuals. 
"3. Vehicles owned by the dealer and used 
occasionally for business or personal purposes 
by the owner or any employee are used in a taxable 
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manner, and the dealer must report and pay a 
tax on such vehicles." (Emphasis added.} 
(CCH, Massachusetts State Tax Reporter, 
Para. 63-853.15} 
The State of Kentucky has provided by regulation: 
"Cars--... if used solely for demonstra-
tion or display (are not subject to tax). 
If used for any other purpose in addition 
to demonstration, then user pays tax on sales 
pri ce to him." 
(Kentucky Regulation 103 KAR 31:100, cited 
at CCH, Kentucky State Tax Reporter, Vol 1 , 
Para. 60-282) 
The State of Nevada provides an exemption from use 
for demonstration, retention or display but requires that 
said use be the "sole use," and said exemption does not ap-
ply to rentals. (NRS 372.170, cited at CCH, Nevada State Tax 
Reporter, Para. 60-169) 
The State of New York essentially uses a regulation 
similar to that of Massachusetts, which provides that vehicle 
which are occasionally demonstrated for business purposes and 
are used for other personal purposes by the owner or any em-
ployee are used in a taxable manner and are subject to sales 
and use tax. (Sales Tax Information Letter, No. 6 (1965), 
cited at CCH New York State Tax Reporter, Para. 64-072) 
South Dakota provides by regulation that demonstra-
tors are not subject to tax unless used for purposes other 
than demonstration; i.e. , personal use, leasing or other com-
mercial use. (South Dakota Regulation, No. 10-45-134.S, cite 
at CCH South Dakota State Tax Reporter, Para. 64-018) 
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Other states have attempted different approaches 
in levying and collecting sales and use taxes on demonstra-
tors not used solely for demonstration purposes. The State 
of Tennessee provides that there is no tax on demonstrators 
if only used for less than 120 days and are sold for more 
than dealers1 cost. There is a use tax on the difference 
between the dealers' cost and selling price. (Rule 3, cited 
at CCH Tennessee Tax Reporter, Para. 64-002) 
The State of Washington provides a use tax on the 
number of demonstrators utilized after the initial number 
of demonstrators authorized in the first year of operation. 
(Excise Tax Bulletin, No. 37.12.132, dated July 8th, 1966, 
cited at CCH Washington State Tax Reporter, Para. 60-079.25) 
The State of Michigan has provided a numerical 
formula for exemption of demonstrators from sales and use 
tax based upon the total number of cars sold each year by 
the dealership. If 0-to-25 cars are sold, two demonstrators 
are exempt; of 26-to-100 cars are sold, 7 demonstrators are 
exempt; if 101-to-500 cars are sold, 20 demonstrators are ex-
empt, and if 501 or more cars are sold in any given year, 25 
demonstrators may be exempt. (Michigan State statute, Sec-
tion 205-51, cited at CCH Michigan State Tax Reporter, Para. 
60-230) 
The State of Utah has attempted to deal with the 
same problem by adopting Sales Tax Regulation S-82 herein-
above set forth, which provides, in part: 
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11
. • • Also, tax applies to items pur-
chased primarily for company or personal 
use and only casually used for demonstra-
tion purposes. For example, a wrecker, or 
a service truck used by a parts 1 department, 
would be subject to tax even though they 
are demonstrated occasionally." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Merrill Bean has testified that unassigned demonstrators are 
loaned to customers having their cars serviced and repaired. 
The utilization of unassigned demonstrators is for the con-
venience and operation of appellant's Sales and Service De-
partment. The unassigned demonstrators are also loaned to 
salesmen who have been unable to sign the agreement, pay the 
rental and acquire a new demonstrator directly assigned to 
them. The unassigned automobiles are driven home and utilize 
by salesmen for personal transportation and for the transpor-
tation of their families, although appellant does not recom-
mend use of any demonstrators for personal purposes. (T-52) 
The technical fine point is that certain unassigned 
demonstrators are being consumed within the meaning of the 
Sales and Use Tax statutes and are subject to said taxes. If 
sales and use taxes are not assessed and collected, appellant 
would be in a privileged position not enjoyed by other tax-
payers who purchase cars, drive them for a short period of ti 
and then resell said vehicles, paying a sales tax on the pur-
chase and collecting a sales tax on the subsequent resale. 
It is convenient that appellant claims that all of his vehicl 
whether unassigned, assigned or loaned to Mrs. Merrill Bean, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
are held for resale. In the context of our economic system 
and capitalism, probably e^ery owner of a vehicle in the 
State of Utah would submit that his vehicle is held for re-
sale, providing he can get the right price for it. 
Should the exemption for demonstration be "solely 
demonstration" in the absence of express language in the 
statute? The rule of construction of exemptions in use tax 
statutes is that such provisions are to be strictly con-
strued against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing author-
ity. In all cases of doubt as to legislative intent, presump-
tion is in favor of the taxing power. To doubt is to deny 
the exemption. (68 Am.Jur. 2d Sales and Use Taxes, Section 
177) 
This Court, in determining exemptions from taxa-
tion in general, has provided guidelines in Parker v. Quinn, 
23 Utah 332, 64 P.961 (1901): 
"... The general rule is that all property 
of what kind soever, and by whomsoever owned, 
is subject to taxation; and, when any kind of 
property is exempt, it constitutes an excep-
tion to this rule. The reason of the rule is 
that it is just and equitable that ewery species 
of property within the state should bear its 
equal proportion of the burdens of the govern-
ment. When, therefore, an owner claims that 
certain property is exempt from taxation, the 
burden is upon him to show that it falls within 
the exception. And an exemption will not be aided 
by judicial interpretation. It must be shown to 
exist by express terms of the enactment which 
it is claimed grants it. 'The presumption is that 
all exemptions intended to be granted were granted 
in express terms. In such cases the rule of strict 
construction applies, and, in order to relieve 
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any species of property from its due and just 
proportion of the burdens of the government, the 
language relied on as creating the exemption 
should be so clear as not to admit of reasonable 
controversy about its meaning; for all doubts 
must be resolved against the exemption. The 
power to tax rests upon necessity, and is es-
sential to the existence of the state. , n 
Appellant has further taken the position that the 
average demonstrator is sold for $26 less than the average 
new car, thereby entitling the State of Utah to its full 
share of sales tax on said vehicle, when ultimately sold to 
a customer. A p p e l l a n t s position is not tenable since the 
vehicle is actually being consumed, giving rise to incidence 
of taxation. Said demonstrator may have up to 6,000 miles and 
six months 1 use without any sales tax at all, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the average sale of said demonstrator is 
$26 less than the average new car sale. Said six months 1 use 
may span different years and may result in the decrease in 
the value of the vehicle when ultimately sold. The proba-
bility of the subsequent sale for $26 less is not certain, 
and the subsequent sale for an average $26 less is not rele-
vant to the actual selling price of any given vehicle, whether 
specifically assigned, unassigned or loaned to Mrs. Merrill 
Bean. Inasmuch as there are not any arms-length transactions 
or exchanges, respondent cannot reasonably determine what cash 
consideration would be given for the vehicle utilized by 
Mrs. Merrill Bean or the unassigned vehicle. The taxation 
approach adopted recognizes the fact that if a 1974 model 
-15-
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were traded for a 1975 model, there would be a differing 
value, which would be represented by an additional cash 
payment to appellant. However, in ewery exchange between 
appellant's corporation and Mrs. Merrill Bean or other 
salesmen utilizing unassigned demonstrators, there is no 
cash consideration given for a transfer of property. Said 
cash consideration, if, in fact, given, would be subject 
to sales tax. 
In conclusion then, appellant, when utilizing un-
assigned demonstrators for personal or other uses, is not 
entitled to exemption from sales and use taxes, although 
said vehicles may occasionally be for demonstration and dis-
play and held for resale. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent sets forth that the basis for the tax-
ation imposed upon unassigned demonstrators and the vehicles 
utilized by Mrs. Merrill Bean is that said tangible personal 
property is being consumed within the meaning of the Sales 
and Use Tax statutes. That upon any subsequent resale or ex-
change, any other sales and use taxes assessed are borne by 
different entities, not parties to this action, those being 
consumers who ultimately purchased the vehicle. Said consump-
tion is sufficient to give rise to an imposition of sales and 
use taxes and cannot be denied simply by the fact that said 
vehicles are to be resold or that they are sometimes on dis-
play and occasionally being actually demonstrated. Sales 
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Tax Regulation S-82 has been lawfully and legally adopt 
by the State Tax Commission within the statutory realm 
of authority and is determinative of the issues raised 
herein. The sales and use tax audit deficiencies asses 
against appellant should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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